[core] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-08

[Joel Halpern]

Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at

<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08

Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC

Major issues: N/A

Minor issues:
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to "compose" the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with what is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it implicit in some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

Nits/editorial comments: N/A

[Göran Selander]

Hi Joel,

Thanks for your review. Comments inline.

Post by Joel Halpern
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC
Major issues: N/A
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to "compose" the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with what is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it implicit in some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side from
data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is described
in:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2

So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD, to
the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL, and
a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.

The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC 5116
to an early section in the draft and that change is already included in
the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.


Best regards
Göran

[Joel M. Halpern]

In terms of my concerns, if Step 7 said "Verify and Decrypt the COSE
object using the Recipient Key as per RFC 5116 Section 2.2" that would
fill in the confusion for this reader.

Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for your review. Comments inline.

Post by Joel Halpern
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC
Major issues: N/A
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to "compose" the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with what is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it implicit in some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side from
data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is described
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2
So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD, to
the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL, and
a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.
The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC 5116
to an early section in the draft and that change is already included in
the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.
Best regards
Göran

[Göran Selander]

Hi Joel,

Thanks for quick feedback, inline.

Post by Joel M. Halpern
In terms of my concerns, if Step 7 said "Verify and Decrypt the COSE
object using the Recipient Key as per RFC 5116 Section 2.2" that would
fill in the confusion for this reader.

Since the AEAD is used throughout the draft, in particular in other parts
of this section I’m thinking that maybe we should add RFC 5116 to the list
of specifications following "Readers are expected to be familiar with” in
Section 1.1. Would that address your comment?

Thanks
Göran

Post by Joel M. Halpern
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for your review. Comments inline.

Post by Joel Halpern
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC
Major issues: N/A
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to "compose" the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with
what
is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it implicit in some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side from
data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is described
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2
So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD, to
the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL, and
a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.
The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC 5116
to an early section in the draft and that change is already included in
the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.
Best regards
Göran

[Joel Halpern Direct]

I guess it is up to you. Personally, I like the idea of the verify
description including some reference to how one actually does verify.
I will leave it to the authors and WG to decide what degree of clarity
is called for here.

Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for quick feedback, inline.

Post by Joel M. Halpern
In terms of my concerns, if Step 7 said "Verify and Decrypt the COSE
object using the Recipient Key as per RFC 5116 Section 2.2" that would
fill in the confusion for this reader.

Since the AEAD is used throughout the draft, in particular in other parts
of this section I’m thinking that maybe we should add RFC 5116 to the list
of specifications following "Readers are expected to be familiar with” in
Section 1.1. Would that address your comment?
Thanks
Göran

Post by Joel M. Halpern
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for your review. Comments inline.

Post by Joel Halpern
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC
Major issues: N/A
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to "compose" the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with
what
is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it implicit in some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side from
data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is described
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2
So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD, to
the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL, and
a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.
The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC 5116
to an early section in the draft and that change is already included in
the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.
Best regards
Göran

[Göran Selander]

How about this (see the last and third to last edit):
https://github.com/core-wg/oscoap/commit/8f277d83

where the reference is made to COSE instead of AEAD?

Best
Göran

Post by Joel Halpern Direct
I guess it is up to you. Personally, I like the idea of the verify
description including some reference to how one actually does verify.
I will leave it to the authors and WG to decide what degree of clarity
is called for here.
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for quick feedback, inline.

Post by Joel M. Halpern
In terms of my concerns, if Step 7 said "Verify and Decrypt the COSE
object using the Recipient Key as per RFC 5116 Section 2.2" that would
fill in the confusion for this reader.

Since the AEAD is used throughout the draft, in particular in other parts
of this section I’m thinking that maybe we should add RFC 5116 to the list
of specifications following "Readers are expected to be familiar with” in
Section 1.1. Would that address your comment?
Thanks
Göran

Post by Joel M. Halpern
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for your review. Comments inline.

Post by Joel Halpern
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed
Standard
RFC
Major issues: N/A
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to
"compose"
the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with
what
is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it
implicit in
some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side from
data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is described
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2
So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD, to
the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL, and
a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.
The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC 5116
to an early section in the draft and that change is already included in
the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.
Best regards
Göran

[Joel M. Halpern]

Yes, that is what I was looking for.
Thank you,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
https://github.com/core-wg/oscoap/commit/8f277d83
where the reference is made to COSE instead of AEAD?
Best
Göran

Post by Joel Halpern Direct
I guess it is up to you. Personally, I like the idea of the verify
description including some reference to how one actually does verify.
I will leave it to the authors and WG to decide what degree of clarity
is called for here.
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for quick feedback, inline.

Post by Joel M. Halpern
In terms of my concerns, if Step 7 said "Verify and Decrypt the COSE
object using the Recipient Key as per RFC 5116 Section 2.2" that would
fill in the confusion for this reader.

Since the AEAD is used throughout the draft, in particular in other parts
of this section I’m thinking that maybe we should add RFC 5116 to the list
of specifications following "Readers are expected to be familiar with” in
Section 1.1. Would that address your comment?
Thanks
Göran

Post by Joel M. Halpern
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for your review. Comments inline.

Post by Joel Halpern
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed
Standard
RFC
Major issues: N/A
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to
"compose"
the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with
what
is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it
implicit in
some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side from
data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is described
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2
So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD, to
the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL, and
a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.
The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC 5116
to an early section in the draft and that change is already included in
the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.
Best regards
Göran

[Alissa Cooper]

Joel, thanks for your review. Göran, thanks for addressing Joel’s comment. Unfortunately I ran out of time to review this document before the telechat.

Alissa

Post by Joel M. Halpern
Yes, that is what I was looking for.
Thank you,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
https://github.com/core-wg/oscoap/commit/8f277d83
where the reference is made to COSE instead of AEAD?
Best
Göran

Post by Joel Halpern Direct
I guess it is up to you. Personally, I like the idea of the verify
description including some reference to how one actually does verify.
I will leave it to the authors and WG to decide what degree of clarity
is called for here.
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for quick feedback, inline.

Post by Joel M. Halpern
In terms of my concerns, if Step 7 said "Verify and Decrypt the COSE
object using the Recipient Key as per RFC 5116 Section 2.2" that would
fill in the confusion for this reader.

Since the AEAD is used throughout the draft, in particular in other parts
of this section I’m thinking that maybe we should add RFC 5116 to the list
of specifications following "Readers are expected to be familiar with” in
Section 1.1. Would that address your comment?
Thanks
Göran

Post by Joel M. Halpern
Yours,
Joel

Post by Göran Selander
Hi Joel,
Thanks for your review. Comments inline.

Post by Joel Halpern
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-02-21
IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed
Standard
RFC
Major issues: N/A
In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to
"compose"
the
Additional Authentication Data. I would have expected it to be "verify"
the Additional Authentication Data. I could imagine that the verification
consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with
what
is
received. But I do not see the comparison step. is it
implicit in
some
other step? This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply missing
something. This may suggest some clarification could be useful.

The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side from
data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is described
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2
So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD, to
the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL, and
a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.
The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC 5116
to an early section in the draft and that change is already included in
the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.
Best regards
Göran

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